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There is a growing consensus that new finan-cial reform legislation may be in order. the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, while well-intended, is now widely viewed to be at best insufficient, and at worst a costly misfire. Members of Congress are considering new and different measures. Some have pro-
posed substantially higher capital requirements for the largest 
financial firms; others favor an updated version of the old Glass-
Steagall regime.
i suggest a simpler approach. it would be compatible with 
other financial stability reforms, but is better understood as a 
substitute for Dodd-Frank and other measures. the proposed 
approach would require new legislation consisting of the follow-
ing specific measures, starting from a pre-Dodd-Frank baseline:
■■ Prohibit the use of short-term debt funding by all finan-
cial firms other than deposit banks. (the financial sector’s 
short-term debt, inclusive of deposits, will be called “broad 
money” herein; this is a conventional term for measures of 
the money supply that include various kinds of non-deposit 
short-term debt.)
■■ Apply reserve requirements (not to be confused with capital 
requirements) to all of the broad money issued by deposit 
banks, thereby giving the Federal reserve the power to cap 
the quantity of broad money outstanding.
■■ Fully insure (i.e., with no coverage caps) all of the broad 
money issued by deposit banks and phase out insurance of 
long-term certificates of deposits.
Morga n r icks is an assistant professor of law at Vanderbilt Law school.
■■ Charge risk-based fees to the deposit-banking sector for 
this public backstop. these fees would continue even if the 
Federal Deposit insurance Corporation’s insurance fund is 
fully funded, at which point the fees would become a fiscal 
revenue item. (in the central banking context, this is called 
“seigniorage”: fiscal revenue from money creation.)
■■ tighten up existing deposit bank portfolio constraints. 
Most importantly, implement a “swaps push-out rule” along 
the lines of Dodd-Frank’s.
■■ replace the Basel Committee’s new liquidity standards with 
an international accord that prohibits financial institutions 
from issuing broad money denominated in nondomestic 
currencies. (in short, wind down the so-called “eurocur-
rency” markets.)
this simpler approach—which we can call the “licensed money” 
approach—obviously centers around the financial sector’s short-
term debt (think maturities of under a year). the approach 
confines the issuance of broad money to the existing deposit 
banking system; it gives the Fed the power to cap the quantity of 
broad money outstanding and to adjust the cap in the conduct 
of monetary policy; it wraps broad money with a public backstop, 
making it sovereign and default-free; and it charges the banking 
system a fee for this public commitment.
the licensed money approach is designed to render the finan-
cial system panic-proof. the term “panic” is used here in a specific 
sense: to quote Ben Bernanke, it is “a generalized run by provid-
ers of short-term funding to a set of financial institutions.” the 
licensed money system is based on the idea that, when it comes 
to financial stability policy, panics are “the problem” (or the main 
one anyway). i’ll discuss this further, below.
A Simpler  
ApproAch to  
FinAnciAl reForm
Financial instability is a problem of monetary system design.
✒ By Morgan ricks
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long-term debt), not the money market. in principle, the licensed 
money system would allow for a very wide degree of latitude for 
nonbank financial firms, subject to appropriate standards of 
disclosure, antifraud, and consumer protection. So nonbanks 
might be given free rein to engage in structured finance, deriva-
tives, proprietary trading, and so forth. But they would not be 
allowed to fund short.
it is sometimes suggested that securities dealers and other 
nonbank financial firms “need” to fund short—that they some-
how cannot conduct their businesses without short-term whole-
sale funding. this argument needs to be put to rest. there is 
nothing about the broker-dealer business model that requires 
unstable short-term funding. Dealers could conduct all their 
current activities while financing themselves entirely with equity 
and longer-term debt. naturally, their cost of financing would 
go up. Some of this cost would be passed through to their 
customers, mostly in the form of higher bid-ask spreads. But 
notice what is not included in the licensed money approach. 
there is nothing here about “systemic” or “macroprudential” 
oversight of the financial system; no designations of nonbank 
financial firms for special regulation; no new resolution authority 
for nonbanks; nothing about the securitization markets; noth-
ing about derivatives (apart from the push-out); no proprietary 
trading limits; nothing about breaking up the banks; and no 
Glass-Steagall-type limitations on affiliations between banks 
and nonbanks. Again, the licensed money system would be com-
patible with those measures, but it should reduce the perceived 
need for them.
The reguLaTory PeriMeTer
the sketch above is silent about what activities can take place 
outside the licensed banking sector. it only says that those activi-
ties must be financed in the capital markets (with equity and/or 
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bid-ask spreads today are subsidized; the dealer-funding model 
has an implicit public backstop. All the more reason to prohibit 
this funding model.
Once nonbank financial firms are financed in the capital 
markets (with equity and longer-term debt) instead of the money 
market, they are amenable to ordinary bankruptcy proceedings—
like any other firm. no special insolvency system for nonbanks is 
required. in this regard, the recognition that “panics are the prob-
lem” is immensely clarifying. if panics really are the problem, then 
financial institution failures do not imperil the broader economy 
so long as they do not trigger a panic. And 
the licensed money approach makes the 
financial system virtually panic-proof.
incidentally, the proposal would mean 
the end of the money market mutual fund 
sector as it exists today. the idea is to have 
only one set of licensed issuers of broad 
money, operating under the purview of 
the money and banking authorities. the 
licensed money system would get the 
Securities and exchange Commission 
out of the monetary business, which falls 
outside its mission and core competency.
it may be useful here to visualize, at a very high level, what 
the licensed money approach would mean for a giant financial 
conglomerate like J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, or Citigroup. 
in simple terms, we can picture the conglomerate as consisting 
of a holding company with two subsidiaries: a big deposit bank 
and a big securities firm. Under the licensed money system, the 
securities firm would be required to “term out”—that is, end its 
reliance on short-term funding. nor would the conglomerate be 
able to simply move its securities business into its deposit bank: 
deposit banks have long been expressly prohibited from engag-
ing in securities dealing, subject to very narrow exceptions (see 
12 U.S.C. § 24). nor could the conglomerate use its deposit bank 
to fund its securities business: the Federal reserve Act already 
imposes strict limitations on such affiliate transactions (see 12 
U.S.C. §§ 371c–371c-1).
But, you might ask, aren’t regulators already taking steps to 
panic-proof the financial system? i am referring here to the new 
liquidity rules that U.S. regulators proposed in October 2013 for 
the biggest financial firms—rules that are designed to implement 
the global “Basel iii” liquidity standards. essentially, the new 
rules, if and when implemented, will require the largest financial 
firms to hold enough liquid securities to cover expected near-term 
outflows in a liquidity squeeze. isn’t this a reasonable approach 
to panic-proofing?
the new rules are probably much better than nothing, but 
there are reasons to question whether this is a good strategy. First, 
the new rules are not generally applicable; they apply only to cer-
tain large financial firms. Short-term funding should therefore be 
expected to migrate outside the purview of the new rules. Second, 
the new rules are necessarily quite complicated. they require a 
specification of what kinds of assets will remain liquid in a crisis, 
as well as an estimation of firms’ expected cash inflows and out-
flows under a stress scenario. needless to say, such estimates are 
quite speculative. As Federal reserve Governor Daniel tarullo 
emphasized in a recent speech, the new rules will not immunize 
the financial system against damaging runs and panics.
Finally, and most importantly, the new liquidity rules are not 
part of an integrated institutional design. in this regard, observe 
that the licensed money system accomplishes several related 
objectives: it makes the entire broad money supply sovereign 
and default-free; it gives the Fed the power to cap the quantity 
of broad money outstanding; it generates seigniorage revenues 
from the entire banking system, not just the central bank; and it 
re-establishes money creation as a matter of national sovereignty 
(more on this in the next section). the new liquidity rules accom-
plish none of those things. they represent an ad hoc patch, not 
a carefully thought-through design.
inTernaTionaL consideraTions
the licensed money system contains a crucial international com-
ponent. today, overseas financial entities issue huge amounts of 
dollar-denominated short-term debt instruments (called “euro-
dollars”). those instruments are typically issued to U.S.-based 
institutions, and the proceeds of issuance are typically invested 
back into the U.S. credit markets. this is classic fractional-reserve 
banking: it is money creation. it involves the issuance of broad 
money denominated in dollars, but it takes place outside the 
reach of U.S. monetary and banking authorities. During the 
recent crisis, the panic in the eurodollar market prompted a 
massive policy response from the Federal reserve, peaking at a 
staggering $580 billion in U.S. dollar funding to foreign institu-
tions via liquidity swaps with foreign central banks.
traditionally, money creation has been viewed as a matter of 
national sovereignty. We presumably have reason to care when 
counterfeiters of U.S. dollars are operating overseas, and U.S. 
authorities are vigilant about combating this activity. Conceptu-
ally speaking, the issuance of dollar-denominated broad monies 
by overseas financial institutions isn’t all that different. 
If panics really are the problem, then financial institution 
failures do not imperil the broader economy so long as 
they do not trigger a panic. And the licensed money  
approach makes the system virtually panic-proof.
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the most straightforward way to deal with this would be 
through an international accord—an addendum to the existing 
Basel capital accord. Countries (or currency areas) would agree 
to prohibit domestic financial institutions from issuing broad 
money denominated in nondomestic currencies. essentially, the 
eurocurrency markets would cease to exist. Money creation would 
be recognized as a sovereign prerogative.
to be clear, none of this would preclude foreign financial 
institutions from owning U.S. deposit banks. Foreign institutions 
could therefore offer dollar-denominated broad money (includ-
ing checkable deposits) to their customers abroad. But their U.S. 
bank subsidiaries would obviously be subject to the full panoply 
of regulatory standards that govern other U.S. banks. Hence, all 
dollar-denominated money creation would fall within the purview 
of U.S. banking and monetary authorities.
Why Panic-Proofing?
the licensed money system is based on the idea that financial 
stability policy should concern itself with panic-proofing—and 
perhaps not much else. this claim often meets with fierce 
resistance, generally on two grounds. the first objection is 
that the problem of financial instability is about much more 
than panics. (Panics, to repeat, are widespread redemptions of 
short-term debt, period.) Panic-proofing, it is said, would not 
necessarily mitigate problems like “asset-price bubbles,” “over-
leverage,” “excessive risk-taking,” and so on. And those other 
problems are taken to pose a serious danger to the broader 
economy in and of themselves, irrespective of their propensity 
to trigger panics.
the second objection complements the first. it holds that, 
even if panics were indeed “the problem” (so to speak), panic-
proofing—eliminating or greatly limiting run-prone funding, 
in one way or another—would not be desirable. there would be 
costs to such an approach, and enforcement would be challeng-
ing. Besides, the argument goes, there are other ways to deal with 
panics. For example, we might leave fragile short-term funding 
untouched while seeking to forestall the types of events that 
trigger panics (collapsed bubbles and so forth). Or we could 
just deal with panics as they arise; that’s what the lender of last 
resort is for, after all.
these are fair objections, and addressing them in detail would 
require a much longer article. i offer only a summary response 
here. Start with the first objection: the claim that things like “bub-
bles” and “overleverage” pose a danger to the broader economy 
in and of themselves, regardless of whether they might trigger a 
panic. Fair enough, but when it comes to institutional design, we 
do have to prioritize. Few would deny that panics do serious dam-
age to the broader economy; they arguably dwarf other financial 
phenomena in their destructiveness. the case against bubbles is 
somewhat less conclusive. As many others have pointed out, the 
dot-com bust of the early 2000s destroyed more wealth than the 
recent housing bust, yet the dot-com episode was followed by only 
a brief and mild recession.
now, maybe what we really care about is debt-fueled bubbles—in 
other words, cycles of debt and deleveraging. A prominent set 
of theories takes this basic tack. these include irving Fisher’s 
“debt deflation” theory, Hyman Minsky’s “financial instability 
hypothesis,” richard Koo’s “balance-sheet recession” theory, Ben 
Bernanke’s “financial accelerator” idea, and John Geanakoplos’s 
“leverage cycle” theory. Generally speaking, the theories do not 
ascribe any particular significance to short-term debt. they are 
about deleveraging in a generic sense, not panics per se. 
even if we accept those theories, we then face some thorny 
policy questions. the theories tend to stress not just financial sec-
tor leverage, but also (or even mostly) overall levels of household 
and business debt. Such matters take us far beyond the traditional 
perimeter of financial regulation. Furthermore, there is reason to 
think that overleverage becomes a serious problem only when the 
economy has been severely damaged by some kind of shock. if 
this is right, and if panics are a principal source of major trauma, 
then panic-proofing might render “overleverage” somewhat less 
problematic. Finally, it is worth considering whether our modern 
answer to panics—basically, an open-ended commitment of public 
support to much of the financial sector—might not be a major 
source of “debt-fueled bubbles” and “overleverage.” if so, then this 
only strengthens the case for rethinking how we deal with panics. 
in the end, there are no conclusive answers to these questions 
and we are left with judgment calls. But there appears to be a 
strong argument that panics should be viewed as the central 
problem for financial stability policy. incidentally, this discus-
sion highlights the problem with lumping various phenomena 
together into a complex “financial crisis” and then treating it as 
the unit of analysis and the thing to be prevented. this method-
ological tendency—which is practically ubiquitous—has major 
consequences for policy analysis. it inevitably draws attention 
away from the panic and toward the purported “excesses” that 
preceded it. As a result, panic-proofing rarely makes it onto the 
policy radar.
this brings us to the second objection mentioned above: the 
claim that even if panics are taken to be “the problem,” panic-
proofing is not a good answer. As noted above, other strategies are 
available: we might tackle panics indirectly by seeking to prevent 
the occurrence of triggering events (like collapsed bubbles), or we 
might just deal with panics on the back end with public liquidity 
support. these arguments raise basic questions about the optimal 
locus of intervention. the notion that we should try to forestall 
triggering events presupposes that we can successfully identify 
them (avoiding both false negatives and false positives) and suc-
cessfully defuse them at reasonable cost. this presumably means 
fighting bubbles, which is sure to be difficult and controversial 
in the moment. relying on the lender of last resort to deal with 
panics is problematic, too. the very existence of this commit-
ment introduces potentially severe distortions into the financial 
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system: it encourages the growth of individual financial firms and 
the financial sector as a whole, and it perversely subsidizes the 
financial sector through artificially low funding costs.
none of this is to say that panic-proofing would be costless 
(more on those costs in a moment). the point is simply that 
the alternatives have serious shortcomings, too, and a robust 
approach to panic-proofing should be on the policy menu—as a 
complement to or even a substitute for other financial stability 
measures.
WhaT aBouT “narroW” Banking?
the licensed money system achieves panic-proofing by making 
the entire broad money supply sovereign and default-free. Public 
backstops of this kind raise obvious moral hazard problems. is 
there a way to do panic-proofing without creating moral hazard? 
One strategy would be to limit issuers of broad money to 
holdings of super-safe assets like base money and/or short-term 
treasuries. this portfolio composition presumably would make 
public backstops of broad money superfluous. there would be 
no need for anything like deposit insurance. 
Proposals of this kind have been around for many decades. 
they go by names like “100 percent reserve 
banking” and “narrow banking.” these 
proposals have typically applied to depos-
its, but there is no reason why they could 
not be applied to broad money. in fact, 
University of Chicago economist John 
Cochrane recently proposed just that. in 
a June 24, 2013 Wall Street Journal op-ed 
titled “Stopping Bank Crises Before they 
Start,” he argues that “the financial sys-
tem needs to be reformed so that it is not 
prone to runs.” His solution: “Don’t let 
financial institutions issue run-prone liabilities”—in other words, 
panic-proofing. Under his design, any financial firm that issues 
run-prone debt, whether or not styled as “deposits,” would have 
to confine its portfolio exclusively to base money and short-term 
treasuries. the proposal is radical: it would do away with the 
existing deposit-banking business model. 
As a method of panic-proofing, Cochrane’s narrow banking 
approach has considerable appeal. However, there are some appar-
ent drawbacks. the fiscal and monetary implications would need 
to be thought through carefully. Under his design, the (broad) 
money supply would apparently be capped at the amount of 
treasury debt outstanding. A long-term balanced budget (as 
farfetched as that might seem today) could present a serious 
monetary problem; at some point, paying down the debt would 
automatically reduce the broad money supply. this raises a com-
plex set of questions about monetary policy independence, fiscal 
management, tax smoothing, and the implications of sovereign 
default. By contrast, under the licensed money system, fiscal 
considerations do not impose limits on the quantity of broad 
money outstanding, as licensed banks can expand their balance 
sheets (i.e., issue money) by investing in high-quality private credit. 
this is not to say that portfolio constraints are unwarranted. 
On the contrary, the licensed money system would take the 
existing system as a starting point. today, U.S. deposit banks are 
basically limited to holding diversified portfolios of relatively 
high-quality credit instruments (loans and investment-grade 
bonds). they may not own stocks or junk bonds, for example. in 
recent decades, the major loophole has been in the derivatives area. 
As noted above, the licensed money system would follow Dodd-
Frank by putting in place a swaps push-out. this is not because 
of any prejudice against derivatives. rather, it simply reflects the 
fact that derivatives generally do not advance the system’s objec-
tives. it is important to keep in mind that the system is designed 
to issue the broad money supply—and banks issue money when 
they acquire credit assets (cash instruments), but generally not 
when they write derivatives (synthetic instruments). An exception 
to the push-out is in order for interest-rate hedging; the Dodd-
Frank Act includes such an exception.
Of course, the licensed money approach raises challenges of 
its own—moral hazard in particular. needless to say, the record of 
deposit insurance in the United States is not unblemished. the 
savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s led to a costly $124 
billion taxpayer bailout. However, it is worth noting that in the 
years preceding the S&L episode, U.S. bank and thrift regulation 
was characterized by glaring design defects. Portfolio constraints 
were relaxed in the early 1980s, allowing thrifts to extend into new 
and riskier asset classes. A reasonably coherent capital regime 
did not exist until 1988. risk-based deposit insurance premiums 
were not introduced until 1991. Finally, prior to 1991, regulators 
were not legally required to shut down critically undercapitalized 
banks and thrifts on a prompt basis, so problems were left to 
fester for years.
in response to the S&L debacle, meaningful improvements 
were made to the design of U.S. depository regulation. And it 
is noteworthy that, despite the staggering magnitude of credit 
impairments in the United States from 2008 to 2010, no taxpayer 
bailout of the deposit insurance system was required—not even 
close. total bank failure costs to the FDiC’s deposit insurance 
The lender-of-last-resort commitment encourages the 
growth of financial firms and the financial sector as a 
whole, and it perversely subsidizes the financial sector 
through artificially low funding costs.
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fund as a result of the recent crisis are estimated to be around 
$100 billion. those losses are being fully recouped from the 
deposit banking sector, whose reported equity capital currently 
stands at $1.6 trillion. in short, the deposit insurance system has 
done more or less what it was designed to do. this experience 
suggests that a well-designed system of portfolio constraints, 
capital requirements, risk-based fees, and supervision can have 
some success in counteracting the effects of moral hazard.
the licensed money approach is incremental; it sees much in 
the current institutional setup that is worth preserving. it would 
modernize the current banking system rather than scrapping it, as 
some narrow banking proponents would do. Still, the similarities 
here are more important than the differences. Both Cochrane’s 
narrow banking approach and the licensed money approach take 
panic-proofing to be the central aim of financial stability policy. 
Once there is agreement on objectives, then it comes down to a 
question of comparative institutional design.
financiaL reguLaTion as  
MoneTary sysTeM design
the last year has seen two remarkable speeches by senior Federal 
reserve officials on the topic of short-term wholesale funding. 
the first came in February 2013 from William Dudley, president 
of the new York Fed. “How comfortable should we be,” Dudley 
asked, “with a system in which critical financial activities con-
tinue to be financed with short-term wholesale funding without 
the safeguards necessary to reduce the risk of runs and the fire 
sales of assets that can threaten the stability of the entire finan-
cial system?” His answer: “i don’t think we should be comfort-
able” with such a system.
Yet, he noted, that is the system we have—even after the finan-
cial reforms of recent years. “[W]e have not come close to fixing 
all the institutional flaws in our wholesale funding markets,” 
Dudley remarked. He offered “two broad paths” for addressing 
the problem:
the first option would be to take steps to curtail the extent of 
short-term wholesale finance in the system. in principle, regula-
tors across a broader set of institutions and markets could take 
steps to directly limit the use of short-term wholesale funding 
to finance longer-term assets…. in other words, regulators could 
require that a greater proportion of market-based finance be 
funded by longer-term debt…. 
the other path would be to expand the range of financial 
intermediation activity that is directly backstopped by the 
central bank’s lender of last resort function.
three months after Dudley’s speech, tarullo addressed the 
same topic. “i strongly believe that we would do the American 
public a fundamental disservice were we to declare victory [over 
financial instability] without tackling the structural weaknesses 
of short-term wholesale funding markets, both in general and as 
they affect the too-big-to-fail problem,” he said. “this is the major 
problem that remains, and i would suggest that additional reform 
measures be evaluated by reference to how effective they could be 
in solving it.” He emphasized the need for policy measures that 
apply “more or less comprehensively to all uses of short-term 
wholesale funding, without regard to the form of the transactions 
or whether the borrower was a prudentially regulated institution.”
it is a remarkable fact that today—more than five years after 
the panics of 2008—so little progress has been made in the area 
of short-term funding. How can this failure be explained? Surely 
part of the answer involves the two objections to panic-proofing 
that were discussed above: first, doubts as to whether panics 
in and of themselves are the main policy problem; and second, 
a vague sense that, even if panics are the main problem, they 
should be addressed indirectly rather than directly. Whatever 
the reason, fragile short-term funding has not been dealt with 
in a meaningful way.
Arguably, we have been making financial stability policy much 
more complicated than it needs to be. Panics are an age-old prob-
lem. they are not about cutting-edge developments in modern 
finance. Short-term debt is primitive, not complex. the upshot 
is that panic-proofing does not entail the extension of regulatory 
oversight or control over the outer reaches of modern finance. 
nor does it entail taking aim at nebulous enemies like “systemic 
risk” or “excessive risk-taking.” it is not clear that these are even 
meaningful concepts—much less that they can provide a sound 
basis for policy.
Legal limits on the issuance of “private money” are nothing 
new. At the risk of stating the obvious: current law prohibits 
the issuance of deposit instruments without a special license. 
in a prior era, similar prohibitions applied to the issuance of 
circulating bank notes. in other words, the law has long made 
money creation a privileged activity. it is widely acknowledged 
that the financial system’s short-term wholesale debt obliga-
tions are functional substitutes for deposits. Yet they have no 
legal-institutional status as such. Hence the short-term wholesale 
funding markets today represent a form of “free banking”: money 
creation without a license and outside the purview of monetary 
and banking authorities.
it is sometimes said that enforcing short-term debt limits 
would be difficult. true, but difficult compared to what? Com-
pared to anti-counterfeiting laws? Capital requirements? Secu-
rities regulation? tax laws? All of those legal systems present 
opportunities for avoidance and evasion. Yes, enforcement is 
challenging—welcome to the law.
the licensed money system is not exactly a method of “finan-
cial regulation.” it is better understood as a modernization of the 
monetary system. implicit in the approach is a counterintuitive 
idea: that financial instability is, at bottom, a problem of monetary 
system design. in fact, it always has been. this recognition brings 
a great deal of clarity to the task at hand, and it points toward a 
far simpler approach to reform.
